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conomists continue to debate whether the Federal
Reserve  would  have  been  able  to  mitigate  the
banking crisis that preceded the Great Depression.
Some believe that regardless of what the Fed might have
been able to do, banks would have continued to fail because
the economy contracted so dramatically. Others believe
that the Fed could have served as a lender of last resort in
response to the widespread run on the banks and avoided
their collapse. 
Even with the right data, properly evaluating the role of
monetary policy — and public policy generally — during the
crucial  years  before  the  Great  Depression  poses 
several  challenges.  Both  federal  and  state  governments
changed  policies  often  in  light  of  economic  conditions.
Additionally,  shocks  to  markets  were  transforming 
the economic landscape. These dimensions make discerning
the impact of Federal Reserve
policy difficult.
In order to overcome such
obstacles, Gary Richardson of
the  University  of  California,
Irvine,  and William Troost  of
the  University  of  Southern
California  set  out  to  find  a
group of banks within an eco-
nomically similar environment
which were subject to the same
state  regulations  but  influ-
enced  by  different  monetary
policies.  Banks  in  Mississippi
fit  the  bill.  In  1913,  the  state
was split evenly into two Federal Reserve districts. The top
half of the state was placed in the Eighth District presided
over by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank. The lower half
was part of the Sixth District which was the domain of the
Atlanta Fed. 
“Mississippi was homogeneous economically and demo-
graphically,” write the authors. “Unemployment rates were
low. Farm debt hovered around one-third to one-fifth of
farm  value.  Rural  counties  concentrated  on  cultivating 
cotton.” Yet, the approach to monetary policy taken by the
Fed bank in each district could not have differed more. The
Atlanta  Fed  followed  a  policy  of  lending  based  on
“Bagehot’s  rule.” According  to  that  doctrine,  the  central
bank should act as a lender of last resort and provide credit
to troubled institutions based on good collateral and at a
penalty interest rate. By contrast, the St. Louis Fed adhered
to the “Real Bills” doctrine. Under that view, monetary pol-
icy  should  allow  the  supply  of  credit  to  contract  as  the
economy contracts because less credit is demanded during
times of weak economic activity. 
In order to assess the outcome of this natural “quasi-
experiment,” the authors needed a wide range of sources to
provide the basis for their historical analysis. Archives of the
Board  of  Governors  detail  communication  between  the
Board and both regional banks and illustrate the approach 
of each. A wide variety of Census Bureau sources allowed
them to control for the differences between Federal Reserve
districts. 
Although a number of different statistical methods were
used to analyze the data, the results tell very similar stories.
In the Sixth District — where the Bagehot intuition gov-
erned policy — the rate of bank failure was lower than in the
Eighth District. 
The authors note that one criticism of this type of analy-
sis is that the results may apply only to this region during the
time  period  studied.  Yet  there
are real lessons that can be drawn
from such a natural experiment.
The  evidence  in  this  study  is
important to understanding the
link  between  banking  panics,
monetary  policy,  and  the  real
effect of both on the economy. In
fact, Richardson and Troost look
deeper  at  the  economic  out-
comes in these two Fed districts
and  discover  that  commerce
slowed  down  less  in  the  Sixth
District as a result of a compara-
tively  stronger  credit  market  in
the  southern  part  of  Mississippi  that  resulted  from  the
Atlanta Fed’s actions. The drop in the number of wholesale
firms,  which  relied  on  available  credit,  was  about  half  as
much in the Sixth District portions of the state as it was in
the Eighth District portions. Additionally, net sales did not
drop as much in the Sixth District portion as they did in the
Eighth District portion.   
All in all this paper supports other studies that suggest
stopping bank panics could have led to a smaller contraction
for the economy as a whole. It also reinforces the idea that
Federal Reserve banks missed an opportunity in the 1930s to
stabilize the banking sector and potentially avoid the severe
downturn that followed. Whatever caveats can be ascribed
to a historical study of the sort authored by Richardson and
Troost,  this  paper  is  a  strong  addition  to  the  body  of
research  detailing  the  failures  of  monetary  policy  in  the
1930s. Such lessons are important today, particularly as they
relate to how the Fed can best perform its role as lender of
last resort. RF
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